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RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Examining differences in cognitive and
affective theory of mind between persons
with high and low extent of somatic
symptoms: an experimental study
Mira A. Preis1, Dennis Golm1,2, Birgit Kröner-Herwig1 and Antonia Barke3*
Abstract
Background: Medically unexplained somatic symptoms are common, associated with disability and strongly related
to depression and anxiety disorders. One interesting, but to date rarely tested, hypothesis is that deficits in both
theory of mind (ToM) and emotional awareness may undergird the phenomenon of somatization. This study
sought to investigate whether or not differences in ToM functioning and self-reported emotional awareness are
associated with somatic symptoms in a sample from the general population.
Methods: The sample consisted of 50 healthy participants (37 females, 13 males) aged between 22 and 64 years
(46.8 ± 11.7) of whom 29 reported a high extent of somatic symptoms (HSR), whereas 21 reported a low extent of
somatic symptoms (LSR) based on the 30 highest and lowest percentiles of the Symptom List norms. The participants’
affective and cognitive ToM were assessed with two experimental paradigms by experimenters who were blind to the
participants’ group membership. In addition, self-reports regarding emotional awareness, alexithymia, depressive and
anxiety symptoms and current affect were collected.
Results: In the experimental tasks, HSR showed lower affective ToM than LSR but the groups did not differ in cognitive
ToM. Although HSR reported lower emotional awareness than LSR in the self-report measure, this group difference
vanished when we controlled for anxiety and depression. Depression, anxiety, emotional awareness and alexithymia
were correlated positively.
Conclusions: The data supported the hypothesis that deficits in affective ToM are related to somatic symptoms. Neither
cognitive ToM nor self-reported emotional awareness were associated with somatic symptoms. Self-reported emotional
awareness, alexithymia and symptoms of depression and anxiety shared a considerable amount of variance.
Keywords: Medically unexplained symptoms, Emotional awareness, Alexithymia, Theory of mind, Emotion recognition,
Somatic symptoms
Background
Medically unexplained somatic symptoms are common
and give rise to high health care utilization resulting in
substantial economic burden for the health care system
[1–3]. They represent 22.9% of patients in general prac-
tice (12-months prevalence) [4]. An examination of the
base rates of somatic symptoms in a representative
sample showed that back pain, joint pain, pain in ex-
tremities, headache and abdominal symptoms (bloating
or intolerance of several foods) as well as cardiovascular
symptoms (palpitations) were the most frequently re-
ported [5]. Extensive evidence has shown that the occur-
rence of somatic symptoms leads to disability [6], high
frequencies of medical consultations [7] and is strongly
related to depression and anxiety disorders [4, 8–12].
Somatic symptoms are more prevalent in patients with
depression and/or anxiety disorders [8, 12] although
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causal relationships cannot be ascertained on the basis
of the available evidence.
The former diagnoses of somatoform disorders in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM, Fourth edition, text-revision; [13]) including
somatization disorder, undifferentiated somatoform dis-
order, conversion disorder, pain disorder, hypochondria-
sis and body dysmorphic disorder were characterized by
the occurrence of somatic symptoms that suggested, but
could not be fully explained by, an underlying medical
condition or the effect of a substance. As medically
unexplained symptoms showed limited reliability, could
accompany different medical conditions and reinforced
the mind-body-dualism, the DSM-5 replaced ‘somato-
form disorders’ with ‘somatic symptom disorder’ (SSD),
characterized by somatic symptoms without the require-
ment that they be medically unexplained that are very
distressing or result in significant disruption of function-
ing, as well as excessive and disproportionate thoughts,
feelings and behaviors regarding those symptoms [14].
The development of somatic symptoms has been
linked to reduced emotional awareness [15, 16] and defi-
cits in the theory of mind [15–17]. According to an early
model by Lane and Schwartz, emotional awareness –
the capacity to perceive and describe one’s feelings – de-
velops in five ascending stages (i) bodily sensations, (ii)
action tendencies and/or global arousal, (iii) pervasive
emotions, (iv) differentiated, attenuated emotions, (v)
peak differentiation and blending of emotions [18]. In
order to make sense of the experience of somatic symp-
toms one has to link them with an emotional state, a
concept or thought or social interaction [17]. Subic-
Wrana and colleagues proposed that decreased emo-
tional awareness, which corresponds to lower stages in
the model of Lane and Schwartz, may lead to the failure
to experience affective arousal as feelings and instead
process it as somatic symptoms [15, 19].
A related construct is alexithymia which literally
means “lacking words for emotions” and which denotes
the difficulty of identifying and describing one’s own
emotional state [20]. This concept has proved fruitful in
a number of contexts [21, 22], but it is still unclear
whether persons with alexithymia mainly have a problem
verbalizing emotions or identifying them in the first
place [20].
Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the ability to attri-
bute mental states, such as desires, intentions and beliefs
to oneself and other people [23] and is essential for
social and behavioral functioning as it enables people to
understand and predict behavior [24]. This multidimen-
sional construct can be differentiated into two subcom-
ponents: cognitive theory of mind, which describes a
cognitive understanding of the difference between the
speaker’s knowledge and that of the listener (knowledge
about beliefs) and affective theory of mind, which
additionally describes the empathic appreciation of the
observed person’s emotional state (knowledge about
emotions) [25]. Subic-Wrana and colleagues assessed
emotional awareness and ToM in hospitalized patients
with somatoform disorder and healthy controls and
found significantly lower scores in both emotional
awareness and ToM functioning in the patient group
[15]. A similar result was found by Zunhammer and col-
leagues in somatoform pain patients [16]. According to
them deficits in both emotional awareness and ToM func-
tioning may underlie the phenomenon of somatization.
This interesting conclusion, however, is based solely on
the use of projective measures, as both the Frith-Happé-
Animations Task (AT; [26]) measuring ToM, and the
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS; [27]), evalu-
ating emotional awareness, are of a projective nature beset
with interpretative difficulties.
The main objective of the present study was to
investigate with non-projective experimental tasks
whether or not differences in ToM functioning and
self-reported emotional awareness are associated with
somatic symptoms. In accordance with the critique of
medically unexplained symptoms that lead to the
changes in the DSM, the present study focused on
self-reported somatic symptoms regardless of whether
they could be medically explained or not. By extend-
ing the work of Subic-Wrana and colleagues, who in-
vestigated patients with somatoform disorder [15], we
investigated an analogue sample of healthy partici-
pants who reported a high (versus a low) extent of
somatic symptoms. Analogue samples have several
advantages: They afford more precise experimental
control, often are more cost effective and allow disen-
gaging factors that are an epiphenomenon of the
disorder studied from factors that may present pre-
cursors [28]. We used two different paradigms that
were developed specifically to assess affective and
cognitive ToM and conducted the study with experi-
menters who were blind to the participants’ extent of
somatic symptoms.
Methods
Design of the study
We used a quasi-experimental design with the between-
subjects factor extent of physical symptoms, divided into
two groups (see details below): participants who
reported a high extent of somatic symptoms (HSR)
and participants who reported a low extent of somatic
symptoms (LSR). The experimenters were blind to
the group membership of the participants throughout
data collection and Faux Pas Recognition Test (FPRT)
ratings (see below).
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Participants
Recruitment
Participants were recruited via newspaper advertise-
ments in Göttingen and the surrounding area. The
participants received 15 Euro for their participation. Fol-
lowing the procedure established by Bogaerts [29, 30],
participants who indicated that they suffer from a pul-
monary, cardiovascular, or neuromuscular disease, sar-
coidosis, or diseases of the thyroid gland or the nervous
system or gastrointestinal diseases were excluded from
the study. In addition, non-native speakers of the
German language were excluded in order to ensure that
all participants were able to understand the instructions
and the vignettes employed by the FPRT.
Sample characteristics
We studied an analogue sample of healthy participants
who belonged to extreme groups regarding their amount
of somatic symptoms (HSR, LSR). In a postal screening,
123 participants (90 female, 33 male) of the general
population who had responded to the newspaper
advertisements completed the Symptom List (SL;
Beschwerden-Liste; [31]). Inclusion criteria for HSR were
scores in the 30 highest and for the LSR scores in the 30
lowest percentiles according to the sex-specific SL
norms. The inclusion criteria were fulfilled by 78 partici-
pants, of these, 28 were excluded due to the described
exclusion criteria. The final sample consisted of N = 50
participants (37 females, 13 males) aged between 22 and
64 years (46.8 ± 11.7). Participants of the HSR group
were older and reported more medical consultations and
hospital stays than participants of the LSR group (for de-
tails see Table 1).
Experimental paradigms
Emotion recognition and affective theory of mind (ERaToM)
The computer-based paradigm developed by Mier and
colleagues [32] measures the ability to recognize emo-
tions from other peoples’ facial expressions (emotion
recognition; ER) and to assign matching intentional
states (affective theory of mind, aToM). The paradigm
consists of three conditions: ER, aToM and a control
condition. In each trial, a statement was displayed for 2 s,
followed by a photograph of a face showing one of three
different emotions (joy, anger, fear) or a neutral expres-
sion. The participants’ task was to evaluate whether or not
the facial expression in the picture matched the preceding
statement. Simultaneous with the picture, two possible an-
swers were displayed (yes/no) and the participants had to
press the corresponding button (yes/no). The displayed
statements varied according to the condition (Fig. 1): For
ER, the statement described one of three emotional states
(This person is angry/afraid/happy). For aToM the state-
ment described one of three emotional intentions/behav-
iors (This person is going to bluster/to run away/to
cheer). The participant had to predict the action of the
depicted person based on their facial expression of a spe-
cific emotion. The recognition of action intention can be
interpreted as a basic process of ToM [33]. As all inten-
tions in this task were driven by an affective state, Mier re-
ferred to them as aToM [32]. In the control condition the
statement referred to a physical feature of the depicted
person (This person is female/blond/older than 30). A
total of 90 trials were displayed (30 trials per condition) in
a pseudorandomized order.
An analysis of errors was carried out with regard to
delayed answers, missing answers and twofold answers:
if a participant did not answer within the given time-
frame of two seconds (delayed answer) or not at all
(missing answer), the trial was coded as an error; if a
participant gave two answers (twofold answers), only the
first answer was coded. After this process, the number
of correct answers was calculated per condition (with a
maximum of 30 per condition) and served as the opera-
tionalisation of ER and aToM, respectively.
Faux pas recognition test (FPRT)
The FPRT assessed cognitive theory of mind (cToM); it
was developed by Stone and colleagues [34]. Before
using the German version of the FPRT translated by
Ströbele [35], the translation was compared to the ori-
ginal by two bilingual speakers to ascertain the accuracy
of the German version. It consists of 20 short stories,
ten of which describe a situation in which a faux pas is
committed, whereas the other ten are control stories
without a faux pas. After each faux pas story, the
Table 1 Differences between the high and low symptom reporters (independent t-tests, Cohen’s d) in age, somatic symptoms
(grouping variable), medical consultations and hospital stays
HSR (n = 29) LSR (n = 21) Differences
Mean SD Mean SD t (47) p d
Age 49.76 10.66 42.71 12.01 2.19 .034 0.63
Somatic symptoms 29.10 8.70 4.69 2.50 12.46 <.001 3.57
Medical consultations (number last 12 months) 8.26 8.39 2.63 2.24 2.85 .001 0.85
Hospital stays (number last 12 months) 0.41 0.78 0.0 0.0 2.37 .022 0.68
HSR high symptom reporter, LSR low symptom reporter
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experimenter asked the participant several questions.
Two questions tested whether the participant detected
the faux pas (detection). If the participant detected the
faux pas, he or she was asked six further questions: three
questions concerning a deeper understanding of the faux
pas (understanding), one question testing whether the
participant could place him or herself in the situation of
the protagonist and guess his/her feelings (emotion) plus
two control questions determining whether the partici-
pant generally understood the story (control). If a par-
ticipant failed to detect the faux pas (no detection) he or
she was directly asked the two control questions but no
further questions. After a control story without a faux
pas, the experimenter asked three questions: The first
one determined whether the participant realised that
there was no faux pas (decline) and two control ques-
tions concerned the general understanding of the
story. If a participant wrongly assigned a faux pas to
a control story, the experimenter still asked the six
faux pas questions (detection, understanding of faux
pas, emotion, and control) as if there had been a faux
pas (see Figure 2).
In the faux pas stories, the participants’ scores on four
scales were calculated: detection, understanding, emo-
tion and general understanding (control questions). Each
correct answer was counted as one point on that scale.
In the control stories, two scales were calculated: decline
and general understanding (control questions). If the
participant correctly realised that there was no faux pas,
two points were counted on the decline scale. If the par-
ticipant wrongly assigned a faux pas to a control story,
he or she received no points on the decline scale. The
participants’ general understanding (control questions)
of all stories was assessed independently from the other
scales. Each correct answer was counted as one point
on that scale even if he or she did not detect a faux
pas or if he or she wrongly assigned a faux pas to a
control story.
The stories were read to the participants, who also had
a copy of the text so that they could simultaneously fol-
low the story in the written version. The experimenters
asked the questions orally and recorded the whole
session with MP3 recorders. After the data acquisition,
the two experimenters independently evaluated the
recording using a pre-defined checklist. First, both ex-
perimenters separately evaluated the answers of two
randomly selected participants and discussed diverging
assessments afterwards. After agreeing and revising the
checklist accordingly, the procedure was repeated with
seven further participants. The interrater reliability was
calculated from the independent ratings for the second
seven cases and was r = .92. This was deemed suffi-
ciently high for the experimenters to proceed separately
from then onwards so that only one experimenter rated
the answers of the remaining participants. (For the seven
cases the divergences were resolved and the agreed
values used for the analyses.)
Psychometric instruments
Somatic symptoms
The SL [31] measures how much a person is affected by
physical symptoms (e.g. shortness of breath, neck and
shoulder pain). It has two parallel forms with 24 items
each. We combined these to assess as many physical
complaints as possible. The participants rated on a four-
point scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (strongly) how much
he/she was affected by the complaint. Internal consisten-
cies of both forms proved to be high in a healthy
population (α = .93) as well as for a sample with psycho-
logical disorders (α = .94) [31]. Likewise, the internal
Fig. 1 The three conditions of the emotion recognition and affective theory of mind (ERaToM). ER = emotion recognition; aToM = affective theory of mind
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consistency in the current sample was high (α = .97). As
we included both parallel forms, the total value was di-
vided by two (which resulted in a maximum achievable
score of 72) in order to determine the percentiles on the
basis of the norm sample [31]. In order to assign the par-
ticipants to the two groups (HSR versus LSR), the sex-
specific percentiles were used. Accordingly, women who
reached a score ≤ 9 and men who reached a score ≤ 5
were classified as LSR (30 lowest percentiles). Women
who reached a score ≥ 20 and men who reached a
score ≥ 15 were classified as HSR (30 highest percentiles).
Emotional awareness
The Emotional Competence Questionnaire (ECQ; Emo-
tionale Kompetenz Fragebogen; [36]) is a questionnaire
that assesses the capacity to recognize, express and ad-
equately cope with emotions. The ECQ contains four
subscales: recognition and understanding of one’s own
feelings (ES, e.g. 17. I can easily recognize my feelings),
recognition and understanding of others’ feelings (EO,
e.g. 6. I can easily describe different emotional states of
my friends), regulation and control of one’s own feelings
(RE, e.g. 19. I can handle my feelings), emotional expres-
sivity (EX, e.g. 53. I can easily put my feelings into
words). For the purpose of this study, the two subscales
(ES and EO) concerned with emotional awareness were
used. Internal consistencies for these subscales were good
(αES = .88, αEO = .91); exactly the same values were found
for the present study [36].
Depression and anxiety
The German version of the Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale (HADS) was used to assess anxiety and
depression in the past week [37]. The HADS was de-
signed for clinical populations suffering from somatic
symptoms and consists of 7 items measuring anxiety
(e.g. I feel tense or overstrung) and 7 items measuring de-
pression (e.g. I am happy) on a 4-point scale. The in-
ternal consistencies for both subscales are satisfactory
(Cronbach’s α = .80 for both Depression and Anxiety)
and comparable to the present study (Depression sub-
scale α = .81, Anxiety subscale α = .83) [37].
Positive and negative affect
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; [38])
is a questionnaire to assess positive and negative affect.
Each of the 20 items (10 assessing positive affect, e.g.
active, strong, proud, excited, 10 assessing negative affect,
e.g. nervous, anxious, distressed, guilty) are rated on a five-
point rating scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
Internal consistencies of both scales are good (αPA = .89,
αNA = .85) [38]. In the current sample, the internal con-
sistencies were also good (αPA = .91, αNA = .90).
Alexithymia
The German version of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale
(TAS-26; [39]) consists of three subscales: difficulty iden-
tifying feelings, difficulty describing feelings to others, and
externally-oriented thinking. The 26 items are rated on a
five-point rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree) and can be used to calculate a sum score.
Internal consistencies for the subscale difficulty identifying
feelings (α = .84) and the total value (α = .81) are good in
previous samples as well as in the present one (difficulty
identifying feelings α = .90, total value α = .87) whereas in-
ternal consistencies for the subscales difficulty describing
Fig. 2 The two conditions (faux pas story, control story without a faux pas) and the questions asked in the Faux Pas Recognition Test (FPRT)
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feelings (α = .69) and externally oriented thinking
(α = .67) were less satisfactory [39]. In the present sample,
the internal consistency for the subscale difficulty describ-
ing feelings was α = .76 and for the subscale externally-
oriented thinking it was α = .52.
Procedure
A written screening, which included the SL [31], demo-
graphic items (age, sex, highest education), the informed
consent and some health-related questions (chronic dis-
eases, use of medication, number of medical consulta-
tions and hospital stays in the last 12 months) was sent
by post to potential participants. Participants who met
the inclusion criteria (see Recruitment and Sample
Characteristics) were invited to the laboratory part of
the study which took place in the Georg-Elias-Müller
Institute for Psychology in Göttingen and was conducted
by two female experimenters, who were blind to the par-
ticipants’ group membership. The study lasted approxi-
mately 90 min and was divided into two parts. In the
first part, the participants’ aToM and cToM were
assessed using the paradigms described (ERaToM,
FPRT). In order to minimize sequence effects, the order
of the two paradigms was balanced between participants
and a break of 5 min between the two tasks was imple-
mented. In the second part, the participants completed a
set of questionnaires including the TAS-26 [39], the
ECQ [36], the HADS [37] and the PANAS [38]. In the
end, the participants were informed about the goals of
the study and had the opportunity to ask questions.
Statistical analyses
The differences between the two groups regarding the
extent of somatic symptoms, emotional awareness, posi-
tive and negative affect, alexithymia, scores in the
ERaToM and the FPRT were examined using independ-
ent analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) with age and sex
as covariates. The covariates were included because the
sample size was rather small and variations in age and
sex may influence the results. The groups showed an age
difference (MHSR = 49.76 ± 10.66; MLSR = 42.71 ± 12.01;
t (47) = 2.19, p = .034; Table 1). In addition, prior re-
search suggested female superiority in theory of mind
and the number of women was not equally distributed
between the groups (even though the proportions did
not differ significantly; HSR: 20 females, 9 males; LSR:
17 females, 4 males; χ2 = 0.91, p = 0.34) [40]. For effect
size, Eta squared is reported [41].
As the groups showed significant differences in anx-
iety/depression and positive and negative affect (see
below), we conducted further exploratory analyses:
ANCOVAs were employed to test whether the difference
between the HSR and LSR in self-reported emotional
awareness, affective ToM and alexithymia were maintained
after controlling for the differences in anxiety/depression
and negative and positive affect (the latter can be found in
Additional file 1: Table S1). In order to analyze the rela-
tionships of the variables among each other, we calcu-
lated Pearson correlations. The significance level was
set at p = 0.05.
Results
Correlations between relevant variables
The correlations between the variables were high (see
Table 2), for example self-reported emotional awareness
showed a strong negative correlation with anxiety/de-
pression (r = −.53, p < .01), with positive and negative
affect (r = .57, p < .01; r = −.57, p < .01) and with the
sum score of the TAS-26 to measure alexithymia
(r = −.76, p < .01).
Group differences in ToM
Affective theory of mind (ERaToM)
Emotion recognition being a precondition of the aToM
task, we calculated whether the groups differed in their
ability to recognize the emotions of the displayed per-
son’s facial expression (ER task) using an ANCOVA with
age and sex as covariates. There were no group differ-
ences between HSR participants and LSR participants
regarding the ER task (F (1, 45) = 2.40, p = 0.13); see
Table 3 for means and standard deviations and Table
4 for the full ANCOVA results). The covariate age
was significantly related to the participants’ ER score
(Fage (1, 45) = 17.91, p < 0.001), whereas the covari-
ate sex was not related to the participants’ ER score
(Fsex (1, 45) = 3.07, p = 0.087). In order to evaluate
whether HSR participants showed reduced aToM com-
pared to LSR participants, we calculated an ANCOVA to
compare the number of correct answers in the aToM task
using age and sex as covariates. HSR participants showed
significantly reduced aToM compared to LSR participants
(F (1, 45) = 4.32, p = 0.043; Table 3, Table 4). The covari-
ates were significantly related to the participants’ aToM
Table 2 Correlations between the variables self-reported emotional
awareness, anxiety/depression, positive and negative affect and
alexithymia
ECQ-ES ECQ-EO HADS PANAS-pos PANAS-neg
ECQ-EO .45**
HADS −.53** .16
PANAS-pos .57** .07 −.66**
PANAS-neg −.57** −.03 .79** −.61**
TAS-26 −.76** −.37** .49** −.47** .53**
ECQ Emotional Competence Questionnaire, ES emotion self, EO emotion other,
HADS Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, PANAS Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule, neg negative emotions, pos positive emotions, TAS-26 Toronto
Alexithymia Scale
**p < 0.01
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(Fage (1, 45) = 8.65, p = 0.005; Fsex (1, 45) = 7.22,
p = 0.010).
Cognitive theory of mind (FPRT)
In order to assess whether HSR participants showed
reduced cToM compared to LSR participants, we per-
formed independent ANCOVAs regarding the 6 scales
of the FPRT (faux pas: detection, understanding, emo-
tion, control; non faux pas: decline, control) using age
and sex as covariates. No group differences were found
(Table 3, Table 5).
Group differences in self-reported emotional awareness
We calculated two ANCOVAs to test whether the HSR
and the LSR groups differed with regard to the two
subscales of the ECQ while using age and sex as covari-
ates. HSR participants reported significantly lower emo-
tional awareness of their own emotions than LSR
participants (F (1, 46) = 7.33, p = 0.009; Table 6). The
covariates were not related to the participants’ self-
reported emotional awareness (Fage (1, 46) = 2.71,
p = 0.11; Fsex (1, 46) = 0.12, p = 0.745).
The groups did not differ with regard to the recognition
of other’s emotions (F (1, 46) = 0.19, p = 0.662) and the
covariates were not related to the participants’ recognition
of other’s emotions (Fage (1, 46) = 0.72, p = 0.400;
Fsex (1, 46) = 2.30, p = 0.136; Table 3, Table 6).
Group differences in depression, anxiety, affect and
alexithymia
In order to calculate whether the groups differed in
depression, anxiety, affect or alexithymia ANCOVAs
were calculated using age and sex as covariates.
Compared to the LSR participants, HSR participants
reported significantly higher depression and anxiety
ratings (F (1, 46) = 18.44, p < 0.001), more negative and
less positive affect (Fpositive affect (1, 46) = 12.42, p = 0.001;
Fnegative affect (1, 46) = 14.14, p < 0.001) and higher alex-
ithymia scores (F (1, 46) = 8.02, p = 0.007). Neither age
nor sex were related to these variables (Table 3, Table 7).
Exploratory analyses
No influence of anxiety and depression on group differences
in aToM
An ANCOVA with the aToM score as dependent and
group as independent variables with the HADS score in
addition to age and sex as covariates showed significant
group differences (F (1, 44) = 4.54, p = 0.039), with a
higher aToM score in the LSR group than in the HSR
Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations of high and low symptom
reporters concerning emotional awareness, the Emotion Recognition
and affective Theory of Mind paradigm (ERaToM), the Faux
Pas Recognition Test (FPRT), anxiety/depression, positive and
negative affect and alexithymia
HSR (n = 29) LSR (n = 21)
Mean SD Mean SD
Emotional Awareness
ECQ-Emotion Self 3.44 0.68 3.89 0.62
ECQ-Emotion Other 3.87 0.42 3.80 0.45
ERaToM (n = 29) (n = 20)
Emotion Recognition (max 30) 21.17 3.19 21.14 3.03
Affective Theory of Mind (max 30) 20.66 2.58 19.92 3.93
FPRT (n = 28) (n = 21)
Faux pas stories
Detection (max 20) 15.32 4.01 16.24 3.83
Understanding (max 30) 15.68 6.06 17.90 5.68
Emotion (max 10) 4.86 2.52 3.95 2.91
Control (max 20) 19.32 1.09 19.43 1.16
Control stories without a faux pas (n = 28) (n = 21)
Decline (max 20) 18.07 2.28 18.48 1.99
Control (max 21) 20.11 1.26 20.24 0.99
Alexithymia
TAS-26 sum score 2.52 0.61 2.12 0.42
Anxiety/Depression
HADS sum score 14.86 7.69 7.05 4.51
Affect
PANAS-pos 31.45 6.40 37.81 7.41
PANAS-neg 23.97 7.01 17.33 6.24
The maximum achievable points concerning the ERaToM and FPRT are stated in
brackets; due to technical problems, the log file of the ERaToM of one participant
was corrupted and the data for the FPRT of another participant was missing.
Thus, for both paradigms the sample size is N = 49; HSR high symptom reporter,
LSR low symptom reporter, ECQ Emotional Competence Questionnaire, HADS
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, TAS-26 Toronto Alexithymia Scale,
PANAS Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, pos positive affect, neg negative affect
Table 4 Differences between high and low symptom reporters
(Analysis of Covariance with age and sex as covariates) in the
Emotion Recognition and affective Theory of Mind paradigm
(ERaToM)
Source df MS F p η2
Emotion Recognition
Covariate age 1 124.41 17.91 < .001 0.262
Covariate sex 1 21.32 3.07 .087 0.045
Group 1 16.70 2.40 .128 0.035
Error 45 6.95
Total 49
Affective Theory of Mind
Covariate age 1 67.92 8.65 .005 0.133
Covariate sex 1 56.66 7.22 .010 0.111
Group 1 33.93 4.32 .043 0.066
Error 45 7.85
Total 49
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group. The covariate HADS score was not related to the
participants’ aToM score (F (1, 44) = 0.51, p = 0.481) while
age and sex were related to the participants’ aToM (Fage (1,
44) = 9.04, p = 0.004; Fsex (1, 44) = 7.10, p = 0.011; Table 8).
Influence of anxiety and depression on group differences in
self-reported emotional awareness
An ANCOVA concerning the self-reported emotional
awareness scores as dependent and group as independent
variables with the HADS score in addition to age and sex
as covariates showed no significant group differences
(F (1, 45) = 0.70, p = 0.408). The covariate HADS score
was significantly related to the participants’ self-reported
emotional awareness (F (1, 47) = 9.58, p = 0.003) while age
and sex were not related to the participants’ self-reported
emotional awareness (Fage (1, 45) = 1.41, p = 0.241;
Fsex (1, 45) = 0.11, p = 0.745; Table 8).
Influence of anxiety and depression on group differences in
alexithymia
As the groups showed significant differences in anxiety
and depression, we performed an ANCOVA examining
the group differences in alexithymia to evaluate whether
the group differences were maintained after controlling
for the differences in anxiety and depression in addition
to age and sex. The ANCOVA with alexithymia as a
dependent and group as an independent variable and
HADS score, age and sex as covariates showed no sig-
nificant group differences (F (1, 45) = 1.29, p = 0.263).
The covariate HADS was significantly related to the par-
ticipants’ alexithymia scores (F(1, 45) = 6.94, p = 0.012)
whereas the covariates age and sex showed no influence
on the participants’ alexithymia scores (Fage (1, 45) = 1.26,
p = 0.268; Fsex (1, 45) = 0.13, p = 0.720; Table 8).
Discussion
The main objective of this study was to investigate
whether or not the occurrence of somatic symptoms is
associated with difficulties in emotional awareness and
Table 5 Differences between high and low symptom reporters
(Analysis of Covariance with age and sex as covariates) in the
Faux Pas Recognition Test (FPRT)
Source df MS F p η2
Faux pas stories
Detection
Covariate age 1 0.12 0.01 .931 0.000
Covariate sex 1 0.37 0.02 .881 0.000
Group 1 7.82 0.48 .490 0.011
Error 45 16.17
Total 49
Understanding
Covariate age 1 33.51 0.95 .334 0.020
Covariate sex 1 20.20 0.58 .452 0.012
Group 1 23.49 0.67 .418 0.014
Error 45 35.161
Total 49
Emotion
Covariate age 1 36.51 5.41 .025 0.100
Covariate sex 1 0.03 0.01 .946 0.000
Group 1 23.38 3.46 .069 0.064
Error 45 6.75
Total 49
Control Questions
Covariate age 1 0.68 0.61 .441 0.011
Covariate sex 1 7.93 7.05 .011 0.134
Group 1 0.09 0.08 .780 0.001
Error 45 1.13
Total 49
Control stories without a faux pas
Decline
Covariate age 1 0.05 0.01 .919 0.000
Covariate sex 1 2.21 0.46 .501 0.010
Group 1 1.09 0.23 .637 0.005
Error 45 4.82
Total 49
Control Questions
Covariate age 1 0.66 0.54 .468 0.011
Covariate sex 1 6.71 5.48 .024 0.107
Group 1 0.03 0.03 .868 0.001
Error 45 1.23
Total 49
Table 6 Differences between high and low symptom reporters
(Analysis of Covariance with age and sex as covariates) in self-
reported emotional awareness
Source df MS F p η2
ECQ-ES
Covariate age 1 1.14 2.71 .106 0.048
Covariate sex 1 0.05 0.11 .745 0.002
Group 1 3.08 7.33 .009 0.131
Error 46 0.42
Total 50
ECQ-EO
Covariate age 1 0.13 0.72 0.399 0.015
Covariate sex 1 0.42 2.30 0.136 0.047
Group 1 0.04 0.19 0.662 0.004
Error 46 0.18
Total 50
ECQ Emotional Competence Questionnaire, ES emotion self, EO emotion other
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ToM functioning. Comparing healthy participants who
reported a high versus a low extent of somatic symptoms
while controlling for age and sex revealed differences in
aToM but not in cToM. When controlling for the
differences in anxiety and depression, there were no
differences in self-reported emotional awareness be-
tween the groups.
HSR and LSR participants differed in aToM but not in cToM
functioning
As the multidimensional construct of ToM can be differ-
entiated in two subcomponents (cToM and aToM), we
used two corresponding tests – the FPRT and the
ERaToM – which were specifically designed to assess
these components, respectively [32, 34]. As a precondi-
tion for the aToM task, we also tested whether the
groups differed in their ability to recognize the emotions
from facial expressions and found no differences. There
were no group differences between HSR participants
compared to LSR participants regarding their cToM, but
participants of the LSR group showed higher aToM than
participants of the HSR group. This divergent result
concerning aToM and cToM is in line with Stonnington
and colleagues [17] who failed to find impaired cToM
functioning in patients with somatoform pain disorders
(as compared to healthy controls), but whose results also
indicated reduced aToM functioning in their patient
group. Subic-Wrana and colleagues [15] found reduced
ToM functioning in patients with somatoform disorders
when compared to healthy controls and Zunhammer
and colleagues [16] reported the same for patients
suffering from chronic somatoform pain. However, in
the latter two studies, affective and cognitive ToM were
not differentiated hindering a direct comparison of the
results. With regard to aToM the current study is in line
with their results and indicates the need for a differenti-
ated approach that incorporates both facets of ToM.
The current study extended previous results as it dem-
onstrated that aToM differences can be observed not
only by contrasting patient groups with healthy controls
but such differences in functioning can be found already
Table 8 Differences between high and low symptom reporters
(Analysis of Covariance with depression/anxiety, age and sex as
covariates) in aToM (affective ToM), emotional awareness (Emotion
Other) and alexithymia
Source df MS F p η2
Affective Theory of Mind (aToM)
Covariate age 1 71.73 9.04 .004 0.139
Covariate sex 1 56.39 7.10 .011 0.109
Covariate HADS 1 4.01 0.51 .481 0.008
Group 1 36.05 4.54 .039 0.675
Error 44 7.94
Total 49
Emotional Awareness (Emotion Other)
Covariate age 1 0.50 1.41 .241 0.025
Covariate sex 1 0.04 0.11 .745 0.002
Covariate HADS 1 3.40 9.58 .003 0.169
Group 1 0.25 0.70 .408 0.792
Error 45 0.36
Total 50
Alexithymia (TAS-26)
Covariate age 1 0.32 1.26 .268 0.023
Covariate sex 1 0.03 0.13 .720 0.002
Covariate HADS 1 1.78 6.94 .012 0.127
Group 1 0.33 1.29 .263 0.824
Error 45 0.29
Total 50
TAS-26 Toronto Alexithymia Scale, HADS Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
Table 7 Differences between high and low symptom reporters
(Analysis of Covariance with age and sex as covariates) in the
anxiety/depression, positive and negative affect and alexithymia
Source df MS F p η2
Alexithymia (TAS-26 sum score)
Covariate age 1 0.69 2.38 .130 0.042
Covariate sex 1 0.04 0.13 .718 0.002
Group 1 2.32 8.02 .007 0.142
Error 46 0.29
Total 50
Anxiety/Depression (HADS)
Covariate age 1 71.16 1.64 .206 0.025
Covariate sex 1 0.18 0.00 .949 0.000
Group 1 798.91 18.44 < .001 0.279
Error 46 43.33
Total 50
Affect
PANAS-pos
Covariate age 1 110.27 2.38 .130 0.039
Covariate sex 1 1.36 0.03 .865 0.000
Group 1 575.44 12.42 .001 0.204
Error 46 46.33
Total 50
PANAS-neg
Covariate age 1 133.31 3.06 .087 0.048
Covariate sex 1 16.07 0.37 .547 0.006
Group 1 616.47 14.14 < .001 0.222
Error 46 43.59
Total 50
TAS-26 Toronto Alexithymia Scale, HADS Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale,
PANAS Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, pos positive affect, neg negative affect
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in an analogue sample. This is of particular import-
ance as it may indicate that aToM deficits precede
and, perhaps, promote the development of a somatic
symptom disorder.
The fact that the high symptom reporters differed
from the low symptom reporters in affective but not in
cognitive ToM may also be rooted in different require-
ments of the tasks: whereas the ERaToM is a speeded
computer based test, the Faux pas test allows more time
and context information; both of which may help to
solve the task. Possibly, existing slight deficits of the high
symptom reporters could be compensated in the cognitive
Faux pas test but not in the speeded ERaToM.
So far, studies that found impaired ToM in patients
with somatoform disorders [15–17] assessed ToM with
the AT. The AT is a projective measure that uses visual
animations featuring two moving triangles in a framed
background. The triangles’ movements can be inter-
preted as ‘interactions’ that ‘make sense’ if the observer
considers that the triangles think, feel or intend (e.g. one
triangle wants to surprise the other). The participants’
task is to describe what happens in the animation. The
answers are then coded firstly with regard to the degree
to which the participants interpreted the purpose of the
actions of one triangle as influencing the mental state of
the other triangle and how appropriately the script had
been captured. We conducted the present study to
broaden the empirical basis by including paradigms that
assess ToM with ecologically more valid stimuli. Firstly,
this allows excluding the participants’ verbal fluency as a
confounding factor. In addition, and more crucially, as
ToM refers to the ability to attribute mental states to
persons (oneself and other people; [23]) it seemed desir-
able to assess this construct by testing whether people
assign feelings to real persons who indeed showed emo-
tional facial expressions rather than to geometrical
figures, which in reality do not have any feelings at all.
The fact that differences in aToM were found with a dif-
ferent experimental paradigm contributes to showing
that the differences found may indeed be robust.
To sum up, the current results indicate a deficit in
aToM in participants reporting a high amount of som-
atic symptoms and clearly highlight the need for future
research that uses different and varied paradigms to as-
sess the two components of ToM.
HSR and LSR participants did not differ in self-reported
emotional awareness after controlling for anxiety/depression
At first glance, HSR participants reported less emotional
awareness regarding their own emotions than LSR
participants, corresponding well with previous results
[15, 16, 19]. However, self-reported emotional awareness
was strongly correlated with symptoms of anxiety and
depression. In line with previous research [8–10, 12],
HSR participants reported higher anxiety and depression
scores in the HADS [37] than LSR participants. For this
reason, we explored the relationship between self-
reported emotional awareness, somatic symptoms and
depression/anxiety more closely and found that HSR
participants did not differ in their awareness of their
own emotions when we controlled for their elevated
depression/anxiety scores. The same held true when we
used alexithymia as a dependent variable and depres-
sion/anxiety as a control variable. Thus the observation
that differences in self-reported emotional awareness are
abolished when controlling for depression and anxiety,
does not seem to be specific to the questionnaire used,
but appears to represent a more robust finding. These
results correspond with those by Stonnington [17] and
Lane [20], but are in contrast with Subic-Wrana [15],
who found significantly lower emotional awareness in
patients with somatoform disorders when compared to
healthy controls, but no relationship between depression
and emotional awareness. However, in their paper, they
did not report the respective statistical measures.
One possible explanation for the diverging results may
lie in the investigated populations. In [15] and [16] the
emotional awareness of hospitalized patients was com-
pared with healthy controls, whereas in the current
study the sample comprised healthy patients who dif-
fered in their extent of somatic symptoms. It is possible
that the differences in emotional awareness may be too
small to be detected in a healthy population. However,
Stonnington [17] who investigated outpatients whose
level of suffering might lie considerably above healthy
participants but slightly below that of inpatients also
failed to find impairments in the emotional awareness.
Differences between hospitalized patients and healthy
controls are not limited to somatic symptoms; hence it
is also possible that other confounding factors may ex-
plain the group differences found in these studies.
Strengths and limitations
A strength of this study lies in the robust methodical
procedure: ToM was assessed by two different experi-
mental paradigms that were specifically developed to as-
sess the two subcomponents of ToM, were multimodal
(computer tasks, text vignettes), required different sen-
sory approaches (auditory, visual) and were conducted
by experimenters who were blind to the participants’ ex-
tent of somatic symptoms. The sample was recruited
from the general population of Göttingen and the sur-
rounding area. In spite of the fact that we compared an
analogue sample formed by using extreme groups with
regard to their extent of somatic symptoms, the participants
were all healthy, which decreases possible confounding fac-
tors. However, the fact that two key variables (sample and
measures) differed from previous studies, limits the direct
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comparability of the results. The negative results concerning
cToM and emotional awareness have to be interpreted in
light of the limited sample size, which – although compar-
able to prior studies [15, 16] – would still benefit from repli-
cation in a larger sample.
Conclusions
Comparing healthy participants who reported a high ver-
sus a low extent of somatic symptoms revealed differ-
ences in aToM but not in cToM. When controlling for
the differences in anxiety and depression there were no
differences in emotional awareness between the groups.
In future research, anxiety and depression should be in-
cluded as control variables when investigating emotional
awareness. The results highlight the need for future
studies that assess ToM and emotional awareness by
means of paradigms with varying degrees of difficulties,
diverging populations and larger samples in order to an-
swer the question whether or not deficits in emotional
awareness or ToM functioning may undergird the
phenomenon of somatization.
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